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Abstract
We consider a repeated electoral competition game between two parties, each repre-
senting a constituent with a given income level. Parties are unable to commit to a
policy before the election; they choose a non-linear income tax schedule once elected.
In each period, citizens cast a vote either for the incumbent or for the challenger. We
first show that there exist (pure strategy) subgame perfect equilibria where both parties
choose the most-preferred tax schedule of their constituent, subject to the constraint
that they are reelected. We characterize a specific class of these BPR (Best Policy with
Reelection) equilibria in which one of the parties plays its constituent’s unconstrained
optimal tax function. Equilibrium tax schedules are always piecewise linear. Depending
on the income levels of the two parties’ constituents, we obtain either classical left-vs-
right equilibria (where the poor vote for one party and the rich for the other one) or
ends-against-the-middle equilibria (where both poor and rich vote for one party while
the middle class votes for the other party). In both types of equilibria both parties
propose the same tax schedule to a subset of the population.
Keywords: Postelection politics, no commitment, ends-against-the-middle, piece-
wise linear income tax
JEL codes: D72, H24
1 Introduction
The determination of income taxes through a democratic process has been extensively
studied over the last three decades. In their seminal contributions Romer (1975) and
Roberts (1977) studied the determination of a linear income tax schedule under ma-
jority voting. This problem being unidimensional, a Condorcet winner (majority voting
equilibrium) exists under quite weak assumptions. It is given by the most-preferred tax
of the individuals with median productivity. This implies that the electoral competition
game between two parties who are able to commit at the campaign stage has a unique
equilibrium in pure strategies, which is given by the Condorcet winner.
The restriction to a linear tax scheme is artificial. It is made for simplicity but cannot
be justified by informational or practical considerations. In reality income tax schedules
are typically non-linear (most often piecewise linear), and marginal tax rates vary with
income. A satisfactory treatment of the democratic choice of income taxes should thus
allow for non-linear taxes. However, with a non-linear tax, the policy space becomes
multi-dimensional, leading to voting cycles and the non-existence of a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of the electoral competition game (Plott (1967)).
Confronted with this difficulty, two different approaches have been adopted. The
first well treaded approach consists in keeping the framework of the Downsian elec-
toral competition but to study solution concepts different from the pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium. Recall that key features of Downsian models is that they concentrate on
one-shot games and that parties are able to commit to their announced policy. The
alternative solution concepts that have been considered include the uncovered set, ob-
tained by eliminating weakly dominated strategies (De Donder and Hindriks (2003))
or the bipartisan set, which is the support of mixed strategies played in equilibrium
(De Donder and Hindriks (2003), Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok (2007)). Roemer (2001)
does depart from the strict Downsian framework but keeps the assumption that parties
can commit to any policy at the electoral stage. This area of research has been dubbed
“preelection politics” by Persson and Tabellini (2000).
The second direction of research, referred to as “postelection politics”, assumes that
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electoral promises are not binding or too vague to matter. Consequently, parties are
effectively unable to commit to any policy before the election. Few papers have followed
this approach when modelling political competition over tax functions. Moreover, these
contributions have focused on one-shot games in which candidates (who have prefer-
ences over the different policies) implement, if elected, their own most-preferred policy.
The policy space is thus reduced to the set of individually optimal policies so that we
essentially return to a single dimensional problem. Roe¨ll (1996) and Bohn and Stuart
(2005) show that a Condorcet winning non-linear taxation schedule exists under rather
mild conditions.
We follow this second strand of research and we take the analysis a step forward by
considering an infinitely repeated electoral competition game with no policy commitment,
building on the work by Duggan (2000) and Banks and Duggan (2008). In our model,
two parties with known preferences compete repeatedly. There is an election in each
period and the party receiving the most votes is elected for that period (majority rule).
Parties are not able to commit to the policy they would implement if elected. The
elected party chooses a tax schedule for the current period and this process is repeated
indefinitely. Citizens then cast their votes on the basis of their expectations of parties’
choices.
We show that, when the parties are sufficiently patient, there exist (pure strategy)
subgame perfect equilibria in which the incumbent party in any given period adopts
the policy that maximizes the utility of its constituent under the constraint that it is
reelected (i.e., that it receives at least 50% of the votes). We label these BPR (Best
Policy with Reelection) equilibria.
We apply this equilibrium concept to a model where citizens differ only according
to their exogenous income level. The income distribution is positively skewed, with
the median income below the mean. The set of admissible tax schedules consists of
all functions that (i) are continuous, (ii) entail marginal tax rates that are nonnegative
and do not exceed one1 and (iii) satisfy the government budget constraint. The identity
of the parties’ constituents are exogenously given. One of the parties, A, represents a
1Where derivatives exist; we do not impose differentiability.
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constituent with income below the median level, while party B stands for a constituent
with income above the median level.
We focus on BPR equilibria in which one of the two parties proposes the most-
preferred tax schedule of the constituent it represents (absent any reelection considera-
tion). We distinguish between four types of equilibria and show that the specific type
that emerges depends on the income levels of the constituents of the two parties. The
party whose constituent is more moderate offers the most-preferred tax schedule of its
constituent, while the other party proposes a policy that satisfies its constituent and
voters up to the median income voter, or an “ends-against-the-middle” policy (where
both poor and rich people vote for one party while the middle class vote for the other
party) if its constituent is very extreme (very far from the median income level).
All BPR equilibria, whatever the identity of the two constituents, exhibit piecewise
linear tax functions proposed by both parties. Furthermore, in all equilibria, both
parties propose the same tax policy to a subset of the electorate. We discuss these
features of BPR equilibria in the concluding section.
2 The model
2.1 The economic model
The economic modelling is borrowed from Roemer (2006). There is a continuum of citi-
zens/voters identified by their exogenous income y, which is distributed on the support
[y−, y+] according to a probability measure H, whose distribution function is denoted
F . We denote by f the density function. We assume that the distribution function is
positively skewed, with the median income ym strictly lower than the average income y.
Let T (y) denote a generic tax function. We restrict the set of admissible tax func-
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tions, denoted by Ω, to functions that are (i) continuous, (ii) satisfy2
0 ≤ T ′(y) ≤ 1 (1)
where differentiable, and (iii) are purely redistributive (there is no revenue requirement)
so that3 ∫ y+
y−
T (y)f(y)dy = 0. (2)
We do not explicitly impose the limited liability condition T (y) ≤ y since this constraint
is not binding at any of the equilibria we consider. Consumption of an individual with
pre-tax income y is denoted by c(y) = y − T (y).4 Utility is increasing in consumption
and denoted by the function u(c) with u′ > 0 and u′′ ≤ 0. Let v(y, T ) = u(y−T ) denote
the utility level of an individual with pre-tax income y who pays a tax of T .
2.2 The political competition game
There are two political parties denoted by A and B. Following Duggan (2000) or Banks
and Duggan (2008), we study a repeated elections model with infinite horizon.5 The
players in this game are the two parties and the voters. At the beginning of each period
t, an election takes place in which voters decide whether to reelect the incumbent party
or to appoint the challenger. The party obtaining the most votes is elected (majority
rule), and gets to choose a tax schedule Tt for the current period. When the two parties
2This condition implies that both tax liabilities and after-tax income are non-decreasing functions of
pre-tax income. Such a condition is usually derived instead of assumed in the optimal tax literature with
endogenous income. Alternatively, we could replace the upperbound on the marginal tax rate by α < 1 as
in Roemer (2009). One interpretation of α is that both parties agree not to enact policies with too large
marginal tax rates (to avoid the distortionary impact of unmodelled labor-leisure substitution). With
this interpretation, marginal tax rates below α create few if any labor supply distortions. Introducing
such an α would not change substantially our results.
3Adding an exogenous revenue requirement would not change our results.
4Given the one-to-one relationship between tax functions T and after-tax consumption functions
c, the game we describe is equivalent to one where parties announce consumption functions rather
than tax functions. In the rest of the paper, we sometimes adopt the shortcut “a party proposes a
consumption function” rather than writing that “a party proposes a tax function that results in the
following consumption function”.
5The main difference between our setting and these models is that we assume that the preferences
of the parties are observable to the voters. In Duggan (2000) and Banks and Duggan (2008), the voters
cannot observe the type of the challenger, which is randomly drawn.
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receive the same proportion of votes, the incumbent party is reelected for sure.6 The
same sequence of events is repeated indefinitely.
An important feature of this model is that elections are not preceded by a campaign
stage with policy announcements. Before the election, parties are not able to commit
to the policy they would implement if elected. This assumption is in contrast with most
election models in the literature and it is crucial to our results. Consider a static game
with policy commitment. In the absence of a Condorcet winner (as is the case in our
model), for any given policy proposed by a party, the other party can put forward an
alternative policy preferred by a majority of voters and thus win the election. This
explains why a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium fails to exist in this static game.7
This result hinges on the commitment assumption: the winning party implements,
once elected, the policy announced during the campaign. This is a strong assumption:
when there is no commitment and parties have policy preferences, the elected party
should implement its ideal policy in a one shot game. The only credible promises at the
campaign stage thus correspond to the ideal policies of the two parties! When elections
are repeated, the set of credible promises is enlarged as the party in power in a given
period balances the short-term benefit of implementing a favored policy with the long-
term benefit of being reelected in future periods. This is precisely the trade-off that we
seek to capture with our modeling.8
We now describe the payoffs and strategies of the two types of actors (namely parties
and voters), starting with the two parties. Party i (i = A,B) represents constituents
with income yi, with yA < ym < yB. Its payoff from the sequence {Tt(.)} of outcomes
is given by
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1 [v(yi, Tt(yi)) + βωit] . (3)
The parties’ payoffs come from two sources. First, parties care about the tax function
enacted because it determines the utility of their constituents. Parties also care about
6This assumption is not crucial to our results. We show later on in the paper that our results extend
to the case in which the incumbent is reelected with a positive probability strictly lower than one in the
case of a tie. We however stick to this assumption for expositional clarity.
7This is true whether parties have policy preferences or not. See Duggan and Fey (2005).
8For the sake of simplicity, we do not model the campaign announcement stage. It is plain however
that parties could not credibly announce policies that are not equilibrium outcomes.
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winning the elections per se, enjoying an additional payoff β > 0 (spoils of office, ego
rents, etc.) when they win the elections at time t. Accordingly, ωit denotes the indicator
function taking the value 1 if party i is elected in period t (and 0 otherwise). The
discount factor is denoted by 0 < δ < 1. A (pure) strategy of party i specifies the policy
Tt(.) chosen once elected in period t, for every possible history of the game at date t.
A type y voter’s payoff from the sequence {Tt(.)} of policy outcomes is the discounted
sum of per-period utility levels:
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1v(y, Tt(y)),
where δ is the same time discount factor as for parties.9
A (pure) strategy of voter j specifies, for every possible history of the game, whether
he votes for the incumbent or for the challenger. We assume that voters act as though
pivotal in the election.10 They vote for the incumbent if the continuation value from re-
electing him is greater than the one obtained when electing the challenger. When indif-
ferent, they are assumed to vote for the incumbent.11 This approach is called prospective
voting.
We are now in a position to characterize a special class of equilibria of this game.
2.3 Best Policy with Reelection equilibria
We first define the optimal tax schedules of a given party i. We distinguish between the
unconstrained optimum and the constrained optimum. Let T opti (.) denote the uncon-
strained optimal tax schedule of party i absent electoral considerations. It is obtained
by maximizing the utility of the party’s constituent (with income yi) over the entire set
9The assumption of identical discount factors is made purely for convenience. Considering different
discount factors for the parties and the citizens would not affect the results.
10This condition can be seen as the analogous of the elimination of weakly dominated strategies, a
criterion widely used in static games to get rid of “unreasonable” equilibria. This also corresponds to
stage-undominated strategies in dynamic models with a finite number of voters (see Baron and Kalai
(1993)).
11This assumption is needed to solve the optimization program of the parties. It can be justified by
considering that voters behave according to the old axiom “better the devil you know than the devil
you don’t” when both the incumbent and the challenger propose the same after-tax income to them.
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of admissible strategies:
T opti (.) = argmax
T∈Ω
v(yi, T (yi)), i = A,B. (4)
The constrained optimum TBPRi (., Tj), on the other hand, is the tax function that
maximizes party i’s constituent’s utility under the constraint that at least 50% of the
voters prefer this tax function to Tj :
TBPRi (., Tj) = argmax
T∈Ω
v(yi, T (yi)), i, j = A,B, i 6= j
s. t. H(y : v(y, T (y)) ≥ v(y, Tj(y))) ≥ 1/2.
The following Proposition states that, when the discount factor is sufficiently large,
there exists a (pure strategy) subgame perfect equilibrium of the electoral competition
game, where both parties offer their preferred policy under the constraint of reelection.
Proposition 1 Assume that there exist two tax schedules T ∗A(.) and T
∗
B(.) such that
T ∗A(.) = T
BPR
A (., T
∗
B) and T
∗
B(.) = T
BPR
B (., T
∗
A). Then there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium, called BPR equilibrium, with the parties playing T ∗i (.) when in office if both
parties are patient enough (i.e., if δ is large enough).
To prove Proposition 1, we resort to the concepts of initial path, punishments and
simple strategy profiles introduced by Abreu (1988). Those concepts are formally de-
fined in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A. A strategy profile for the parties
is a rule prescribing an initial path and punishments for any deviation from the initial
path, or from a previously prescribed punishment, where a path (or punishment) is
an infinite stream of one-period action profiles. In the BPR equilibrium we study, the
initial path (denoted by Q0) prescribes that each party i, once elected, proposes its
optimal constrained policy, T ∗i (.). If any party deviates from this prescription, it is to
be punished in all subsequent periods. We restrict ourselves to simple strategy profiles,
where punishments are history-independent, in the sense that we specify the same pun-
ishment Qi for any deviation, after any previous history, by party i. The punishments
used to sustain the BPR equilibrium are as follows: if party i is in power and deviates
in period t, then the other party j (j 6= i) plays its optimal constrained policy T ∗j (.) if
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elected in t + 1, while party i would play if elected a policy that a majority of voters
dislike compared to T ∗j (.). The exact same punishment is repeated for all periods after
t+ 1.
These simple strategies define the following play of the game. As long as both parties
have played according to Q0 in the past (i.e., every incumbent i has always played T ∗i (.)),
the incumbent in the next period also abides by Q0 and plays its optimal constrained
policy. As soon as one incumbent i deviates from Q0 in period t, it is punished by
both parties switching to the punishment Qi in all subsequent periods. Likewise, if one
incumbent j at time k deviates from the required punishment Qi (i = j or i 6= j), it is
punished by a move from Qi to Qj in all subsequent periods: parties also get punished
if they fail to punish the other party.
We first have to state how voters compute the continuation value associated with
both parties at time t. This requires that voters anticipate, for any given history of
the game, which policy each party would implement if elected at any future period. As
usual in the literature, we assume that the expectations of the voters are in line with
the strategies used by the parties. That is, if the history of the game is consistent with
both parties having played Q0 in the past (i.e., incumbents have always implemented
their optimal constrained policy), voters assume that they will do so in the future as
well. If one incumbent i has just deviated from Q0, voters assume that parties will play
according to the punishment Qi in the future, and similarly if the incumbent i has just
deviated from the prescribed punishment Qj (j = i or j 6= i).
We are now in a position to give the intuition for Proposition 1. Abiding by the
initial path Q0 at all stages allows the incumbent party i to be reelected (because voters
anticipate that parties will play their optimal unconstrained strategies at any stage in
the future) and gives this party (who remains in power for ever) a constant stream of
pay-offs with two components: the utility from implementing its optimal constrained
policy T ∗i (.) and the spoils of office term β. We now test deviations, using Proposition
1 in Abreu (1988) which states that perfection of the candidate equilibrium may be
verified by checking “one-shot” deviations alone (i.e., deviations followed by conformity
with the strategy profile in question). Observe first that voters gain nothing by deviating
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from their strategy (voting for the party offering them the highest continuation value,
computed as explained above) since, with a continuum of voters, no one is decisive.
Observe then that, among parties, only the incumbent can deviate at time t. If the
incumbent deviates from the prescribed Q0 at time t, voters anticipate that Qi will be
played in the future, so that the current incumbent will never be reelected (and thus
will lose the spoils of office terms) and will have to do with the optimal constrained
policy of the other party. Faced with this prospect, the best deviation by an incumbent
at time t consists in playing its optimal unconstrained strategy, to maximize its payoff
at time t, followed by a stream a lower pay-offs in the future. We show in the Appendix
that, unsurprisingly, if the incumbent is patient enough it will prefer to stick with the
flow of pay-offs associated with the initial path Q0 rather than deviating from this path.
We also have to show that parties have no incentive to deviate from the punishments
prescribed. Assume that the history of the game is such that penalty Qi should be
played in the next period (i.e., the current incumbent i at time t− 1 has deviated from
its prescribed behavior). A majority of citizens then vote for party j 6= i at time t.
The punishment Qi is such that party j should play its optimal constrained policy and
remain in power in all future periods. This corresponds to the flow of payoffs that this
party would obtain with the initial path Q0 in case of incumbency, and the same lower
bound on this party’s patience which guarantees that this party does not deviate from
Q0 then also ensures that it does not deviate from the punishment Qi. As for party i,
it is voted out of office in period t and remains in the opposition for ever, which robs
this party from any decision in the future.12 We then obtain that there exists a BPR
(subgame perfect) equilibrium as described in Proposition 1 provided that parties are
patient enough.
We have assumed so far that, when the two parties receive the same number of votes,
the incumbent is reelected for sure. We now argue that Proposition 1 generalizes to the
case where the incumbent is reelected with some positive probability (lower than one)
12If we further assume that party i plays T opti in punishment Q
i (a policy that a majority of voters
dislike compared to T ∗j ), we further obtain that this party would have no incentive to deviate from its
prescribed action under Qi, even in the out-of-equilibrium situation where party i would unexpectedly
come back to power under punishment Qi.
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when it obtains the same fraction of votes as the challenger. The payoff when following
strategy Q0 then becomes a lottery. Assuming without loss of generality that party A is
the incumbent, abiding by strategy Q0 ensures a flow of lotteries consisting of a payoff of
v(yA, T
∗
A(yA))+β with some positive probability and a payoff of v(yA, T
∗
B(yA)) otherwise.
The payoff in case of deviation by A from Q0 is not affected and remains given by (14)
in the Appendix. It is straightforward to check that, if party A is patient enough,
the payoff associated with playing Q0 is larger than the payoff obtained if deviating.13
Observe that this result is robust to many different ways of specifying the probability
that the incumbent is reelected when both parties tie for winning (this probability may
be time dependent and may depend or not on the identity of the incumbent at time t).
In the remainder of the paper, we characterize a specific and particularly interesting
class of BPR equilibria, namely those in which one of the parties is not effectively
constrained by electoral considerations. In other words, this party offers its constituents’
unconstrained optimal policy. We distinguish between four types of equilibria which we
first characterize (Sections 4 and 5) before establishing their existence (Section 6).
3 Individually optimal tax schedules
Before studying equilibria of the electoral competition game, we describe the optimal
tax schedules of individual voters. Ideally, individuals with income yi would like to
completely expropriate people with income below and above yi, setting their net income
to 0. However, they face the constraints that the tax function must be continuous and
that marginal tax rates (where they exist) have to be between 0 and 1. Under these
restrictions, it is plain that they should set a marginal tax rate of 0 to all individuals
with income below yi and of 1 to individuals with higher incomes. The optimal tax
schedule of an individual with income yi is thus given by
14
T opti (y) = max [y − yi, 0]− Iopti , (y, yi) ∈ [y−, y+]2 (5)
13The payoff associated with the lottery is lower than the payoff obtained when the incumbent is
reelected with certainty, so that the lower-bound on δ above which Proposition 1 holds is larger (while
remaining strictly less than one).
14A formal proof, following the same technique as in the proof of Proposition 2, is left to the reader.
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where Iopti > 0 is the transfer (negative income tax) received by the individual with the
lowest income, y−. Put differently it is the difference between this individual’s after-tax
(net) and before-tax (gross) income. Graphically, Iopti measures the intercept of the
net income schedule in the (gross, net) income space [y−, y+]× [y−, y+]. It is obtained
from the government budget constraint (hereafter GBC) which, using (2) and (5) can
be written as∫ yi
y−
(y + Iopti )f(y)dy +
∫ y+
yi
(yi + I
opt
i )f(y)dy =
∫ y+
y−
yf(y)dy ≡ y.
Solving this expression yields
Iopti =
∫ y+
yi
(y − yi)f(y)dy.
Consequently, the difference between net and gross income of the poorest individual
with party i’s (i = A,B) unconstrained optimal tax schedule is given by
IoptA =
∫ y+
yA
(y − yA)dF, (6)
IoptB =
∫ y+
yB
(y − yB)dF , (7)
so that IoptA > I
opt
B > 0 since yA < yB < y+.
For some of our arguments it is convenient to define copti (.), the optimal consumption
function of individuals with income yi:
copti (y) = I
opt
i +min [y, yi] , (y, yi) ∈ [y−, y+]2.
It is optimal in the sense that it is induced by the individual’s optimal tax schedule.
The unconstrained optimal consumption schedules of parties A and B are represented
on Figure 1.
The remainder of the paper concentrates on situations where one party proposes its
unconstrained most-preferred policy. To be more precise, we consider BPR equilibria
which are such that the reelection constraint is not effectively binding for one of the
parties, in the sense that this party i is reelected for sure when playing T opti . These
equilibria have a number of interesting features. We characterize them and show that
they exist which in itself is a very interesting (and rather surprising) property.
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In section 4, party B (representing the richer constituent) offers its unconstrained
most-preferred policy, T optB . We first identify the optimal policy by party A in the set
of feasible tax schedules that all below-median income voters prefer to party B’s policy.
We then study the optimal policy for party A under the constraint that a non-null set of
voters whose income is less than the mean do not favor A’s policy over B’s. We call this
policy the best alternative to the simple policy referred to above. Section 5 performs the
same exercise when party A proposes its unconstrained most-preferred policy. Section 6
studies the conditions (on the identity of the parties’ constituents income levels yA and
yB) under which these pairs of policies constitute a BPR equilibrium of the electoral
game.
Observe that the Best Policy with Reelection TBPRi (., Tj) and the unconstrained
optimal policy T opti (.) do not depend on the shape of the utility functions v and u. The
analysis contained in the rest of the paper is thus valid for any increasing utility function
that satisfies condition (17) in Appendix A.
4 Party B proposes its unconstrained most-preferred pol-
icy
Assume for the time being that B plays its unconstrained optimal strategy T optB (or
equivalently the consumption function coptB ). With this hypothesis, party B’s behavior
is well-defined and to characterize the equilibrium we only have to determine party A’s
strategy. In other words, we have to determine party A’s BPR reply to coptB . In this
section, we assume that the reelection constraint is binding for party A—i.e., that party
A would gather strictly less than one half of the vote it were to propose its unconstrained
optimal policy T optA (or equivalently c
opt
A ). Observe from Figure 1 that a necessary and
sufficient condition for the reelection constraint to be binding for party A’s BPR when
faced with coptB is that c
opt
A intersects c
opt
B to the left of ym. We then assume throughout
this section that the following assumption holds:
Assumption 1: coptA (ym) < c
opt
B (ym).
Under Assumption 1, party B is reelected for sure if it proposes coptB while party
A enacts its BPR once in office. Party B then has no incentive to choose a schedule
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different from coptB . This section then concentrates on party A’s BPR under Assumption
1. Interestingly it will turn out that this strategy can obey two quite distinct patterns.
Under pattern I, voters will be divided simply along the income line, with the “poor”
supporting party A while the “rich” vote for B. The other pattern, II, is of the “end-
against-the-middle” type with the poor and the rich supporting partyA while the middle
class supports B.
Turning to the formal construction of the equilibria, let cji (x, yB, yA) denote the
consumption level of an individual with income x, induced by the tax schedule played
in a type j equilibrium by party i, when party B represents an individual with income
yB and party A an individual with income yA. When no ambiguity can arise, we simply
use the notation cji (.) (and T
j
i (.) for the corresponding tax function).
We now identify a simple tax function that allows party A to be reelected with the
support of all individuals with an income below the median ym. Party A’s corresponding
after-tax schedule, denoted by cIBA , is defined as follows (see Figure 2):
cIBA (y) =

coptB (y) + I
IB
2 if y− ≤ y ≤ yA
cIBA (yA) if yA < y ≤ y′A
coptB (y) if y
′
A ≤ y ≤ ym
coptB (ym) if ym ≤ y ≤ y+
All individuals with an income lower than yA face a zero marginal tax rate. As
can be seen from Figure 2, we denote by y′A the pre-tax income threshold such that
(i) individuals with yA ≤ y < y′A face a marginal tax of one while individuals with
y′A < y < ym face a zero marginal tax rate, and (ii) c
IB
A (y) = c
opt
B (y) for the individuals
whose income y is between y′A and ym. Above ym, marginal tax rates under party A’s
policy are all equal to one. It is easy to see that cIBA (.) is fully determined by the value
of cIBA (0) —i.e., by I
IB
2 — and we set the value of I
IB
2 such that c
IB
A (.) integrates to the
mean of the income distribution.15
We prove the following Proposition in Appendix B:16
15The formal proof can be found in the working paper version of this article, which is available at
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP7054.asp.
16The proof follows closely the proof of Theorem 4 in Roemer (2009). We are indebted to John
Roemer for pointing out this powerful proof method to our attention.
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Proposition 2 The function cIBA (y) is the solution to the following optimization pro-
gram:
max c(yA) such that (8)
c(y) ≥ coptB (y) for y ≤ ym,
0 ≤ c′(y) ≤ 1,∫ y+
y−
c(y)dF (y) ≤ y¯.
In words, the schedule cIBA (.) is the best schedule for party A in the set of feasible
schedules where all individuals with an income at most equal to the median income
ym weakly prefer party A’s schedule to c
opt
B (.). The intuition for why c
IB
A (.) is the best
schedule for party A in that class runs as follows. Starting from cIBA (.), if party A wants
to increase the after-tax consumption level of individuals with income yA, it necessarily
has to give a little less income to people with income above y′A (in order to satisfy the
GBC; see Figure 2). But then, the proportion of people (weakly) preferring this tax
schedule to coptB is strictly less than 50%.
There is of course no reason to restrict a priori tax schemes to be such that the
support for party A is made exclusively of low income individuals. We also have to
consider tax schedules where the support for any party is not an interval of voters.
Observe first that, if a best response by party A to coptB does not win the votes of all
voters with income is below the median level ym, then it must be of the “ends-against-
the-middle” form. A simple inspection of Figure 2, shows that, once A’s policy crosses
coptB , it must stay below (i.e., offer a lower consumption level than c
opt
B ) until it runs into
the horizontal section of coptB (starting with some y ≥ yB), at which point it of course
coincides with coptB (since giving more consumption than c
opt
B would be a waste of money
for party A). We can then restrict the search for party A’ best schedule to the set of
schedules such that c(y) ≥ coptB for y ∈ Ω = [y−, y1] ∪ [y′′A, y+], y1 < ym < y′′A, where
H(Ω) = 1/2.17 To do so, we proceed in two steps: we first set exogenously the threshold
incomes y1 and y
′′
A such that H(Ω) = 1/2, and look for Party A’s best schedule among
17It is straightforward that the constraint that H(Ω) is at least equal to one half is binding at the
optimum, otherwise party A could increase c(yA) while still satisfying its reelection constraint.
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those offering at least coptB to all individuals in Ω. Next, we optimize with respect to
y1 and y
′′
A (keeping H(Ω) = 1/2) to find the tax schedule that maximizes party A’s
payoff.18
For given thresholds y1 and y
′′
A such that H(Ω) = 1/2, we define the following
schedule (see Figure 2), denoted by cIIBA (y), as:
19
cIIBA (y) =

coptB (y) + I
IIB
2 if y− ≤ y ≤ yA
cIIBA (yA) if yA < y ≤ yˆA
coptB (y) if yˆA ≤ y ≤ y1
cIIBA (y1) if y1 < y ≤ y˜A
cIIBA (y˜A) + y − y˜A if y˜A < y ≤ y′′A
coptB (y) if y
′′
A ≤ y ≤ y+
(9)
The following proposition is established in Appendix C:
Proposition 3 Fix the set Ω = [y−, y1] ∪ [y′′A, y+] where y1 < ym < y′′A and such that
H(Ω) = 1/2. The function cIIBA (y) is the solution to the following optimization program:
max c(yA) such that (10)
y ∈ Ω⇒ c(y) ≥ coptB (y),
0 ≤ c′(y) ≤ 1,∫ y+
y−
c(y)dF (y) ≤ y¯.
Proposition 3 states that the function cIIBA is party A’s best response to c
opt
B when
the set of feasible tax schedules for A is restricted to those giving at least the same
consumption as coptB for the 50% of the polity belonging to the exogenous set Ω. It is
clear from the definition of Ω that there is a unidimensional family of cIIBA functions
associated with Ω. In other words, by varying the value of (say) y1 while choosing the
value of y′′A such that H(Ω) = 1/2, party A can span the set of feasible tax functions
guaranteeing reelection as defined by (9). Party A then chooses the tax function that
maximizes the value of c(yA).
20
18We thank John Roemer for suggesting this proof strategy.
19Figure 2 is drawn for the case where y1 < y
′
A and c
IIB
A (yA) < c
IB
A (yA), but it is easy to draw the
same Figure with y1 = y
′
A and/or c
IIB
A (yA) ≥ cIBA (yA).
20For the formal statement of this optimization problem, see the working paper version referred to in
footnote 15.
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We now give, with the help of Figure 2, the intuition as to why this tax schedule is
the best alternative to schedule cIBA . In order to maximize the consumption level offered
to individuals with pre-tax income yA, party A has to propose a zero marginal tax rate
to individuals with y ≤ yA (negative marginal tax rates being prohibited). Since we
are looking for a schedule that is not such that all below-median income agents vote
for A, it must be the case that cIIBA crosses c
opt
B at some y = y1 < ym. All individuals
with y ≤ y1 then vote for party A. The least costly way to obtain the support of these
voters is to tax those with yA < y < y1 at 100% at the margin, under the constraint
that they receive at least as much as with coptB . That is, we have that c
IIB′
A (y) = 0 for
yA < y < yˆA and c
IIB′
A (y) = 1 together with c
IIB
A (y) = c
opt
B (y) for yˆA < y < y1. Since
y1 < ym, party A needs the support of agents with income levels higher than yB. Given
our prohibition of negative marginal tax rates, it is impossible for party A to garner the
support of agents with income between y1 and yB. This means that there must exist
an income level y > yB, which we call y
′′
A, such that c
IIB
A (y
′′
A) = c
opt
B (y
′′
A). Given that
copt
′
B (y) = 0 for y ≥ yB, we obtain that cIIBA (y) = coptB (y) for all y′′A ≤ y ≤ y+. Party
A chooses the values of y1 and y
′′
A in order to maximize c
IIB
A (yA) under the constraint
that it gathers one half of the votes —i.e., that
∫ y1
y− dF +
∫ y+
y′′A
dF = 1/2.
We have thus shown that, under Assumption 1 and when party B plays coptB , party
A’s BPR is either cIBA (where low income agents vote for party A while high income
voters support party B) or cIIBA (an “ends-against-the-middle” situation, where low and
high income voters support party A while middle income agents vote for party B). To
determine which of these two candidates effectively represents the party’s best policy we
simply have to compare the respective consumption levels they imply for its constituent
(an individual with income yA). We have that c
IB
A is better when c
IB
A (yA) > c
IIB
A (yA),
while cIIBA is better if the opposite relationship occurs. We summarize the results
obtained in this section in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, if party B proposes its unconstrained most-preferred
schedule coptB , then party A’s best response is to offer either c
IB
A or c
IIB
A . In either case,
(i) a subset of the population obtains the same after-tax income under the tax schedules
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proposed by both parties, and (ii) party B has no incentive to deviate from coptB .
5 Party A proposes its unconstrained most-preferred pol-
icy
The analysis developed in this section parallels the one introduced in the previous
section, except that the roles played by the two parties are reversed. We now assume that
A plays its unconstrained optimal strategy T optA . The corresponding after-tax schedule
coptA is depicted on Figure 3. We assume that the reelection constraint is binding for
party B when faced with coptA (i.e., policy c
opt
A is preferred by a strict majority of voters
to coptB ), which translates into the following Assumption (the counterpart to Assumption
1):
Assumption 2: coptA (ym) > c
opt
B (ym).
Under Assumption 2, party A is (re)elected for sure if it proposes T optA (or equiv-
alently coptA ) while party B enacts its constrained optimal policy once in office. Party
A then has no incentive to choose a schedule different from coptA , and we construct
party B’s best response. As in the previous section, we start by constructing the best
tax/consumption schedule satisfying pattern I where only high income agents vote for
party B. We then show that the only alternative to this schedule is an “end-against-the-
middle” proposal belonging to pattern II, where the poor and the rich support party
B while the middle class supports A.21
We first construct a simple tax function that allows party B to receive the votes of
all individuals with an income above the median ym. Party B’s schedule is denoted by
cIAB and is constructed as follows (see Figure 3):
cIAB (y) =

y + IIA1 if y− ≤ y ≤ ym
coptA (y) if ym < y ≤ y′B
cIAB (y
′
B) + y − y′B if y′B ≤ y ≤ yB
cIAB (yB) if yB ≤ y ≤ y+
All individuals with pre-tax income above yB face a marginal tax rate of one. Let y
′
B
denote the threshold income level such that (i) all individuals with income in between
21Observe the contrast with section 4, where the middle class votes for party B while the extremes
support party A.
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ym and y
′
B face a marginal tax rate of one while individuals with income in-between y
′
B
and yB face a zero marginal tax rate, and (ii) c
IA
B (y) = c
opt
A (y) for the individuals whose
income y is between ym and y
′
B. Lower-than-median income individuals are faced with
a zero marginal tax rate. It is easy to see that cIAB (.) is determined completely (see
working paper version for a formal proof) by the value of cIAB (0) —i.e., by I
IA
1 — and
we choose the value of IIA1 that is such that c
IA
B (.) integrates to the mean of the income
distribution.
We now state the following proposition:22
Proposition 5 The function cIAB (y) is the solution to the following optimization pro-
gram:
max c(yB) such that (11)
c(y) ≥ coptA (y) for y ≥ ym,
0 ≤ c′(y) ≤ 1,∫ y+
y−
c(y)dF (y) ≤ y¯.
In words, the schedule cIAB (.) is the best feasible schedule for party B among all those
where all individuals with an income larger than the median income ym weakly prefer
party B’s schedule to coptA (.). The intuition for why c
IA
B (.) is the best schedule for party
B in that class runs as follows. Starting from cIAB (.), if party B wants to increase the
after-tax consumption level of individuals with income yB, it necessarily has to give more
to all individuals with y′B ≤ y ≤ y+, because of the prohibition of negative marginal tax
rates. Because of the GBC, it then has to give less consumption to some individuals
with income lower than y′B, including individuals with y < ym (since marginal tax rate
cannot exceed one). But then, the proportion of people (weakly) preferring this tax
schedule to coptA is strictly less than 50%.
There is of course no reason to restrict a priori tax schemes to be such that the
support for party B is made exclusively of high income individuals. An argument similar
to the one developed in the previous section shows that any tax function by party B
22The proof follows closely the proof of Proposition 2 and is left to the reader.
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that is not supported by all voters with above-median income must be of the “ends-
against-the-middle” type. We then restrict the search for the best schedule by party B
to the set of schedules such that c(y) ≥ coptB for y ∈ Ω = [y−, y′′B]∪[y2, y+], y′′B < ym < y2,
where H(Ω) = 1/2. We proceed in the same two steps as in the previous section: we
first set exogenously the threshold incomes y′′B and y2 such that H(Ω) = 1/2 and look
for the best schedule for party B among those offering at least coptA to all individuals in
Ω. We then optimize with respect to y′′B and y2 (keeping H(Ω) = 1/2) to find the tax
schedule that maximizes party B’s payoff.
For given thresholds y′′B and y2 such that H(Ω) = 1/2, we define the following
schedule (see Figure 3),23 denoted by cIIAB (y):
cIIAB (y) =

coptA (y) if y− ≤ y ≤ y′′B
cIIAB (y
′′
B) if y
′′
B < y ≤ y˜B
cIIAB (y˜B) + y − y˜B if y˜B < y ≤ y2
coptA (y2) if y2 < y ≤ yˆB
cIIAB (yˆB) + y − yˆB if yˆB < y ≤ yB
cIIAB (yB) if yB ≤ y ≤ y+
The proof of the following proposition follows closely the one of Proposition 3 and
is left to the reader:
Proposition 6 Fix the set Ω = [y−, y′′B] ∪ [y2, y+], y′′B < ym < y2, where H(Ω) = 1/2.
The function cIIAB (y) is the solution to the following optimization program:
max c(yB) such that (12)
y ∈ Ω⇒ c(y) ≥ coptA (y),
0 ≤ c′(y) ≤ 1,∫ y+
y−
c(y)dF (y) ≤ y¯.
Proposition 6 states that the function cIIAB is party B’s best response to c
opt
A when
the set of feasible tax schedules for B is restricted to those giving at least the same
consumption as coptA for the voters whose income level belong to the exogenous set Ω,
23Figure 3 is drawn for the case where y2 < yˆB and c
IIA
B (yB) < c
IA
B (yB), but it is easy to draw the
same Figure with y2 = yˆB and/or c
IIA
B (yB) ≥ cIAB (yB).
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whose measure is one half. By the same argument as in the previous section, party B
chooses among the unidimensional set of policies cIIAB (indexed for instance by y
′′
B) the
one that maximizes c(yB).
We now give, with the help of Figure 3, the intuition as to why this tax schedule is
the best alternative to schedule cIAB . In order to maximize the consumption level offered
to individuals with pre-tax income yB, party B has to impose a 100% marginal tax rate
on individuals with y > yB (larger marginal tax rates being prohibited). Since we are
looking for a schedule that is not such that all above-median income agents vote for B,
it must be the case that cIIAB crosses c
opt
A at some y = y2 > ym (with c
IIA
B (y) < c
opt
A (y)
for y = y2 − ε, for ε arbitrarily small and positive). All individuals with y ≥ y2 then
vote for party B. The least costly way to obtain the support of these voters is to tax
those with y2 ≤ y ≤ yˆB < yB at 100% at the margin while giving them exactly the same
consumption level than with coptB , and to impose a zero marginal tax rate on individuals
yˆB ≤ y < yB (see Figure 3). Since y2 > ym, party B needs the support from agents with
income levels lower than yA. Given our prohibition of marginal tax rates larger than
one, it is impossible for party B to have the support of agents with income between
yA and y2. This means that there must exist an income level y < yA, which we call
y′′B, such that c
IIA
B (y
′′
B) = c
opt
A (y
′′
B). Given that c
opt′
A (y) = 1 for y < yA, we obtain that
cIIAB (y) = c
opt
A (y) for all y− ≤ y ≤ y′′B. Party B chooses the values of y2 and y′′B in order
to maximize cIIAB (yB) under the constraint that it gathers one half of the votes —i.e.,
that
∫ y′′B
y− dF +
∫ y+
y2
dF = 1/2.
We have thus shown that, under Assumption 2 and when party A plays coptA , party
B’s BPR is either cIAB (where low income agents vote for party A and high income
voters support party B) or cIIAB (an “ends-against-the-middle” situation, where low and
high income voters support party B while middle income agents vote for party A). To
determine which of these two candidates effectively represents the party’s best policy we
simply have to compare the respective consumption levels they imply for its constituent
(an individual with income yB). We have that c
IA
B is better when c
IA
B (yA) > c
IIA
B (yB),
while cIIAB is better if the opposite relationship occurs. We summarize the results
obtained in this section in the following proposition.
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Proposition 7 Under Assumption 2, if party A proposes its unconstrained most-preferred
schedule coptA , then party B’s best response is to offer either c
IA
B or c
IIA
B . In either case,
(i) a subset of the population obtains the same after-tax income under the tax schedules
proposed by both parties, and (ii) party A has no incentive to deviate from coptA .
So far we have characterized policy pairs that potentially constitute BPR equilib-
ria of the electoral game. In each case we have posited that one of the parties (B in
Section 4 and A in Section 5) was playing its unconstrained optimal policy. We have
constructed two potential BPR schedules for the other party. Determining the best of
these two schedules implies a comparison of endogenous variables. The next section
studies the circumstances under which the policy pairs described here and in the pre-
vious section effectively constitute a BPR equilibrium. For this we provide conditions
on the income levels yA and yB of the parties’ respective constituents which are the
fundamental exogenous variables underlying our analysis.
To make the argument crisper, some extra terminology is useful. An outcome will be
referred to as “Type I” equilibrium when parties receive the support of either the poorer
or the richer part of the electorate, while “Type II” equilibria are of the ends-against-
the-middle variety (one party receives the support of the poorer and richer voters while
voters in the middle of the income distribution support the other party). We also index
the equilibrium type by the identity of the party proposing its unconstrained optimal
policy, to obtain the following definitions:
Definition 1
In a type IA equilibrium, party A proposes c
opt
A while party B proposes c
IA
B .
In a type IIA equilibrium, party A proposes c
opt
A while party B proposes c
IIA
B .
In a type IB equilibrium, party B proposes c
opt
B while party A proposes c
IB
A .
In a type IIB equilibrium, party B proposes c
opt
B while party A proposes c
IIB
A .
6 Equilibrium partition
We are now in a position to state our main result.
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Proposition 8 The space (yB, yA) can be partitioned into four regions, each corre-
sponding to a different BPR equilibrium. There exist three decreasing functions of yB,
denoted by ΦA, Φ and ΦB, that are such that
if y− ≤ yA ≤ ΦB(yB), the equilibrium is of type IIB;
if ΦB(yB) ≤ yA ≤ Φ(yB), the equilibrium is of type IB;
if Φ(yB) ≤ yA ≤ ΦA(yB), the equilibrium is of type IA;
if ΦA(yB) ≤ yA, the equilibrium is of type IIA.
The three functions and the partition of equilibria they delineate are represented
on Figure 4. The formal proof of Proposition 8 is provided in Appendix D. Here we
restrict ourselves to presenting the underlying intuition.
If the median income individuals are indifferent between both parties’ unconstrained
most-preferred policies (T optA and T
opt
B ), then the unique equilibrium is such that each
party proposes its unconstrained most-preferred policy. This is because under this policy
any incumbent party will be reelected with one half of the votes. The locus of pairs
(yB, yA) for which this is true is represented by the function yA = Φ(yB). To the left
of this schedule (in the (yB, yA) space - see Figure 4), Assumption 1 holds so that by
Proposition 7 and Definition 1, the equilibrium of the game is of Type IB or IIB; it
is party B who proposes its unconstrained optimal policy. Similarly, to the right of Φ,
Assumption 2 holds and, by Proposition 4 and Definition 1, the equilibrium of the game
is of Type IA or IIA, and it is party A who proposes its unconstrained optimal policy.
Intuitively, we obtain that party A proposes its unconstrained optimal policy (i.e.,
Assumption 2 holds) if yB is large enough (i.e., very different from ym) for a given
yA, or if yA is large enough (i.e., close enough to ym) for a given yB. The proof of
Proposition 8 also shows that the function Φ is decreasing in yB.
24 This means that,
24To understand why Φ decreases with yB , observe first that the space of most-preferred after-tax
income schedules is unidimensional and can be indexed by the pre-tax income of the individual (since
there is a unique kink in the most-preferred after-tax income function, with zero marginal tax rate
below and unitary marginal tax rate above — see Figure 1). We show in the Appendix that indi-
vidual preferences are single-peaked in the space of most-preferred policies. That is, the utility that
an individual with gross income y achieves with the most-preferred tax schedule of an individual with
gross income x increases with x when x < y and decreases with x when x > y. This in turn implies
that, as yB increases, the value of yA for which the median income individual is indifferent between the
most-preferred policies of yA and yB decreases.
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the lower yA is (i.e., the more different it is from ym), the larger (i.e., the more different
from ym) yB has to be in order for party A to propose its unconstrained optimal policy
at equilibrium. In other words, the party with a moderate (i.e., close to the median)
constituent offers its optimal unconstrained policy. Finally, we obtain that, if yB is large
enough (close enough to the maximum income y+), then whatever the value of yA ≤ ym,
the equilibrium is of type IA or IIA.
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We now turn to the policy offered by the party not playing its unconstrained most-
preferred policy at the equilibrium. We obtain from Proposition 8 and Figure 4 that
policies that divide the electorate between poorer and richer voters (Type I) are played
if the parties’ constituents are close to the locus yA = Φ(yB): the party that is more
extreme offers a policy that satisfies its base and voters up to the median income level
if its base is not too extreme, and an ends-against-the-middle policy if its constituent is
very extreme (very far from the median). The intuition for this result comes from the
observation that policies cIAB and c
IB
A respectively tend toward c
opt
B and c
opt
A when yA
and yB become arbitrary close to Φ. This is not the case for policies c
IIA
B and c
IIB
A . For
any point such that yA = Φ(yB), the only equilibrium consists in both parties offering
their unconstrained optimal policy. As we move slightly away from Φ by, say increasing
yA, the schedule c
IA
B remains very close to c
opt
B (while ensuring that party B is reelected
if it is the incumbent), and thus gives more utility to party B’s constituents than the
schedule cIIAB .
The fact that both ΦA and ΦB decrease with yB is intuitive once we look at Figure
4. We see that the locus ΦB gives, for any value of yA, the minimum value of yB that
is compatible with a Type I equilibrium. Similarly, ΦA gives, for values of yA large
enough, the maximum value of yB compatible with a Type I equilibrium. In other
words, ΦB and ΦA determine the boundaries of an interval of values of yB for which
we have a Type I equilibrium. The fact that both functions ΦB and ΦA are decreasing
25This is due to the fact that the median income individual strictly prefers the unconstrained optimal
tax schedule of party A (whatever the value of yA < ym) to the one of party B when yB is arbitrarily
close to y+. This preference in turn comes from the observation that, under any individual y’s most-
preferred policy, all individuals with an income above y obtain at least the average income y¯. On the
other hand, individual y+’s most preferred policy is the laissez-faire, so that with a positively skewed
income distribution the median income prefers the policy advocated by party A to the laissez-faire.
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in yB means that this interval moves to the right (its two extreme values increase) as
yA decreases. This is intuitive since the value of yB for which both parties play their
unconstrained most-preferred policy also increases when yA decreases.
Finally, observe that there is some asymmetry in the model because of the assump-
tion that the median income is lower than the mean. This asymmetry benefits party A
(whose constituent has a lower-than-median income) in the following sense: there exist
equilibria where party A proposes its unconstrained optimal policy even when yA is
extreme (i.e., very low – provided of course that yB is also extreme, i.e., large enough)
while there is no equilibrium where party B proposes its unconstrained optimal policy
when yB is extreme (i.e., large enough, whatever the value of yA).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a repeated electoral competition game between two parties,
each maximizing the utility of a different citizen. Citizens differ only according to their
exogenous income level. Parties are unable to commit to any policy before the election;
they choose a non-linear income tax schedule once elected. In each period, citizens cast
a vote either for the incumbent or for the challenger.
We first show that there exist (pure strategy) subgame perfect equilibria where
both parties choose the most-preferred tax schedule of their constituent subject to the
constraint that they are reelected. We characterize a class of these (Best Policy with
Reelection, or BPR) equilibria for which one of the two parties plays the unconstrained
optimal tax schedule of its constituents. We obtain that tax schedules in such BPR
equilibria are always piecewise linear. We distinguish between four types of equilibria
and show that the specific type that emerges depends on the income levels of the con-
stituents of the two parties. The party whose constituent is more moderate offers its
optimal unconstrained policy, while the other party proposes a policy that satisfies its
constituent and voters up to the median income voter, or an “ends-against-the-middle”
policy if its constituent is very extreme (very far from the median income level). All
types of equilibria are such that both parties propose the same tax schedule for a subset
of the population.
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How do these results relate to the income tax schedules observed in reality? Piecewise
linearity is a very common feature in practice. It is worth emphasizing that we do not
assume that tax functions have this property, but rather that we start from a much
larger set of admissible non-linear functions and that we obtain piecewise linearity as a
property of all tax functions proposed in BPR equilibria. In all equilibria we consider,
one party proposes a tax function with only two brackets while the other party proposes
a tax function with more than two brackets. One way to generate more brackets at
equilibrium would be to assume that parties represent more than one constituent (i.e.
income level). We leave such an extension for future research.
We also obtain that, in all equilibria studied, one party proposes a tax function (with
minimum marginal tax rate up to a threshold income level and the maximum marginal
rate above) that exhibits both marginal and average progressivity. The tax function
proposed by the other party may not be progressive (except for very specific combi-
nations of yA and yB). Marginal progressivity is a characteristic of many real world
tax schedules and is notoriously difficult to obtain as a solution in an optimal taxation
framework. Average progressivity, on the other hand, is an even more common charac-
teristic of real world tax schedules but our setting offers just one of the many possible
explanations (which include essentially the entire optimal income tax literature).
Finally, in all equilibria studied both parties propose the same tax schedule to a sub-
set of the population. This characteristic of equilibrium tax schedules is also obtained by
Roemer (2009) who studies the same economic environment and the same set of admis-
sible tax functions but who develops another electoral competition game where parties
can commit to electoral promises. Roemer (2009) also uses data on income taxation in
the US from 1960 to 2004 to check whether both parties propose the same tax schedule
for a subset of the population. Since parties do not compete by announcing precise tax
schedules,26 Roemer (2009) looks at major tax reforms, attributing the reform to the
party of the President at the time of reform. The reform then becomes the status quo
until a new reform is enacted. He can then attribute both the status quo legislation
26This observation is much more in line with the postelection politics approach developed here than
with the preelection politics model developed in Roemer (2009).
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and the reform to political parties. He obtains that most reforms do not change the
effective tax-and-transfer rates faced by the middle class. His empirical evidence then
supports our type I equilibria, which have this characteristic. Roemer (2009) also argues
empirically that the Democratic party is more supported by poorer voters while richer
voters tend to favor the Republican party. This observation is also more in line with
Type I equilibria than with ends-against-the-middle, Type II, equilibria. Interpreting
both observations in the light of our model leads us to the conclusion that both US
parties represent constituents whose income level is not too far from the median voter’s
income level.
Our paper admittedly falls short on several accounts. First, we restrict the set
of equilibria to BPR equilibria where one party proposes the most-preferred policy of
its constituent, absent any electoral consideration. It would be worthwhile to look at
non-BPR equilibria in this setting.
Finally, incentive effects on the labor supply decision are absent from our model.
Introducing a preference for leisure and thus a distortionary impact of income taxation
would constitute an interesting extension. This would certainly yield less extreme results
which would have a more realistic flavor. In particular marginal tax rates of one would
no longer emerge and be replaced by the tax revenue maximizing rates (maximum of
Laffer curve).
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APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 1
As stated in the text, we resort to the concepts of simple strategy profiles, initial path
and punishments introduced by Abreu (1988). The initial path Q0 is an infinite stream
of one-period pairs of actions, one for each party in the case this party is the incumbent
(a party not elected in period t has no action to undertake in that period). We define
Q0 = {(T ∗A(.), T ∗B(.)) , (T ∗A(.), T ∗B(.)) , (T ∗A(.), T ∗B(.)) , ...} .
The punishments are given by the following infinite stream of one-period pairs of actions.
The punishment if party A deviates is given by
QA =
{(
T optA (.), T
∗
B(.)
)
,
(
T optA (.), T
∗
B(.)
)
,
(
T optA (.), T
∗
B(.)
)
, ...
}
,
while the punishment if party B deviates is given by
QB =
{(
T ∗A(.), T
opt
B (.)
)
,
(
T ∗A(.), T
opt
B (.)
)
,
(
T ∗A(.), T
opt
B (.)
)
, ...
}
.
The prescription for each party is to play Q0 if both parties have always followed
Q0 in the past and to play the punishment Qi if player i has just deviated from Q0.
Also, parties have to keep playing the punishment for ever after party i has deviated
from Q0, say in period t: if party j (j = i or j 6= i) deviates from the punishment at
date k ≥ t, then both parties have to play Qj for ever starting at k + 1.
If the history of the vote at time t is consistent with both parties having played Q0
in all periods, voters assume that players continue to play according to Q0, so that A
if elected will implement T ∗A(.) while B will implement T
∗
B(.) if elected. If the history
is such that party i has just deviated from its prescribed action (as described above),
then voters anticipate that parties will follow Qi from now on. In all cases, citizens
use these beliefs to compute the continuation value of each party and they vote for the
party offering the highest continuation value.
Assume that both parties have followed the prescribed strategy Q0 up to period t,
and that party A is the incumbent. By abiding by strategy Q0 now and in the future,
27
party A remains in office for ever (since voters identify a vote for party A as a vote
for T ∗A(.) and a vote for B as a vote for T
∗
B(.), and since T
∗
A(.) is by definition the best
policy that guarantees reelection for party A when faced with the alternative T ∗B(.)) and
obtains the payoff:
(1− δ)
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−t [v(yA, T ∗A(yA)) + β] = v(yA, T
∗
A(yA)) + β. (13)
As explained in the text, Abreu (1988, Proposition 1) states that the subgame per-
fection of the simple strategy profile generated by (Q0, QA, QB) may be verified by
checking “one-shot” deviations alone (i.e., deviations followed by conformity with the
strategy profile in question). Voters gain nothing by deviating from their strategy (vot-
ing for the party offering them the highest continuation value, computed as explained
above) since, with a continuum of voters, no single voter is decisive.
Assume for the moment that T ∗A(.) 6= T optA (.) and that T ∗B(.) 6= T optB (.). By definition
of T ∗B, it must be the case that a majority of voters prefer T
∗
A to T
opt
B (or else, we
would have that T ∗B = T
opt
B ), ensuring that party A is elected at each round with the
punishment QB. Likewise, we have that a majority of voters prefer T ∗B to T
opt
A (or else,
we would have that T ∗A = T
opt
A ), ensuring that party B is elected at each round with
the punishment QA.
Consider first the possibility of a one-shot deviation from Q0 by A. Party A may only
deviate at any given stage if it is the current incumbent. According to the strategies
defined above, party A anticipates that both parties will play QA after a deviation,
which means (given voters’ anticipations) that it will never be reelected again in the
future and will have to face the policy T ∗B(.) for ever. Faced with this prospect, party A
if it deviates chooses to implement its optimal unconstrained policy, T optA (.). The payoff
of A following the deviation is thus given by
(1− δ)
(
v(yA, T
opt
A (yA)) + β
)
+ (1− δ)
∞∑
t=2
δt−1v(yA, T ∗B(yA))
= (1− δ)
(
v(yA, T
opt
A (yA)) + β
)
+ δv(yA, T
∗
B(yA)). (14)
Comparing the payoffs associated with the initial path Q0, (13), with that achieved in
28
case of a deviation (14), shows that A should remain on the initial path if and only if
δ ≥ v(yA, T
opt
A (yA))− v(yA, T ∗A(yA))
v(yA, T
opt
A (yA))− v(yA, T ∗B(yA)) + β
, (15)
i.e., if party A is patient enough. Note that the right hand side of (15) is strictly lower
than one if v(yA, T
∗
A(yA))+ β > v(yA, T
∗
B(yA))–i.e., if party A is better off in office with
its optimal constrained policy than out of office with the optimal constrained policy of
the other party, a condition that is always satisfied (for any β ≥ 0).
We now have to check that party B has no incentive to deviate from the punishment
path QA. When sticking to the policy choice implied by QA, B obtains the payoff:
(1− δ)
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−t [v(yB, T ∗B(yB)) + β] = v(yB, T
∗
B(yB)) + β.
It if it deviates from QA, B is punished in all subsequent periods according to QB and
gets the following continuation value:
(1− δ)
(
v(yB, T
opt
B (yB)) + β
)
+ δv(yB, T
∗
A(yB)).
Comparing the two previous expressions, B should not deviate when
δ ≥ v(yB, T
opt
B (yB))− v(yB, T ∗B(yB))
v(yB, T
opt
B (yB))− v(yB, T ∗A(yB)) + β
. (16)
The right hand side of (16) is strictly lower than one if v(yB, T
∗
B(yB))+β > v(yB, T
∗
A(yB))–
i.e., if party B is better off in office with its optimal constrained policy than out of office
with the optimal constrained policy of the other party, a condition that is always satis-
fied (for any β ≥ 0).
Observe now that the inequality that must be satisfied for party B not to have an
incentive to deviate from the initial path Q0 is the same as (16) —i.e., the inequality
that guarantees that party B abides by the punishment path QA. In both cases, party B
remains for ever in office with its optimal constrained policy if it follows the prescribed
actions, with the punishment for a deviation being the same since it is given by QB in
both cases. Likewise, the inequality that must be satisfied for party A to abide by QB
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is (as given by (15)), the same as the one that is required for the same party to follow
the initial path Q0.27
We have assumed up to now that T ∗A(.) 6= T optA (.) and that T ∗B(.) 6= T optB (.). Suppose
now that T ∗A(.) = T
opt
A (.) while T
∗
B(.) 6= T optB (.), so that the punishment paths are given
by
QA =
{(
T optA (.), T
∗
B(.)
)
,
(
T optA (.), T
∗
B(.)
)
,
(
T optA (.), T
∗
B(.)
)
, ...
}
,
QB =
{(
T optA (.), T
opt
B (.)
)
,
(
T optA (.), T
opt
B (.)
)
,
(
T optA (.), T
opt
B (.)
)
, ...
}
.
Party A wins with its optimal unconstrained policy under both Q0 and QA and has
thus no incentive to deviate from either. As for QB, a majority of voters must favor
T optA to T
opt
B , or else we would have that T
∗
B = T
B
opt. Party A thus has no incentive to
deviate from QB. Party B has no incentive to deviate from QA if
δ ≥ v(yB, T
opt
B (yB))− v(yB, T ∗B(yB))
v(yB, T
opt
B (yB))− v(yB, T optA (yB)) + β
,
whose right hand side is strictly lower than one since v(yB, T
∗
B(yB))+β > v(yB, T
opt
A (yB))
for any β ≥ 0. This same equation also guarantees that party B won’t deviate from the
initial path Q0 (and also from QA, in the out-of-equilibrium situation where B returns
to power while both parties play QA).
We can deal similarly with the situation where T ∗B(.) = T
opt
B (.), whether or not
T ∗A(.) 6= T optA (.).
We then obtain that there exists a BPR (subgame perfect) equilibrium as described
in Proposition 1 provided that
δ ≥ δ˜ ≡ max{ v(yA, T
opt
A (yA))− v(yA, T ∗A(yA))
v(yA, T
opt
A (yA))− v(yA, T ∗B(yA)) + β
,
v(yB, T
opt
B (yB))− v(yB, T ∗B(yB))
v(yB, T
opt
B (yB))− v(yB, T ∗A(yB)) + β
},
(17)
with 0 < δ˜ < 1.
27Party i has no opportunity to deviate from punishment Qi (i = A,B) since it is never in power
according to this punishment. Observe also that, even if party i somehow managed to be elected while
the other party correctly plays Qi (an out-of-equilibrium situation), it would definitely play T opti , which
is the policy prescribed by punishment Qi.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that cIBA (y) does not solve the optimization
program (8), but rather that the function c∗(y) does. Define g(y) = c∗(y)− cIBA (y), and
consider the convex combination (1 − ε)cIBA (y) + εc∗(y) = cIBA (yA) + εg(yA), which is
also feasible for program (8).
Define
∆(ε) = cIBA (yA) + εg(yA)
−
∫ yA
y−
εg′(y)β(y)dy +
∫ y′A
yA
εg′(y)γ(y)dy
−
∫ ym
y′A
εg′(y)δ(y)dy +
∫ y+
ym
εg′(y)α(y)dy
+
∫ ym
y′A
(
cIBA (y) + εg(y)− coptB (y)
)
η(y)dy
+ρ
[
y¯ −
∫ y+
y−
(
cIBA (y) + εg(y)
)
dF (y)
]
,
where α(y), β(y), δ(y), γ(y), η(y) are non-negative functions and ρ is a non-negative
number.
Observe that ∆ is linear in ε, with ∆(0) corresponding to program (8) with cIBA (.),
and with ∆(1) corresponding to program (8) with c∗(.), plus a series of non-negative
terms: for instance, in the intervals [y−, yA] and [y′A, ym], g
′ ≤ 0 because cIB′A (y) = 1.
Suppose that we can find α(y), β(y), δ(y), γ(y), η(y) and ρ (all non-negative) such
that ∆′(0) ≤ 0. Since ∆ is a linear function of ε, it will follow that ∆(0) ≥ ∆(1), which
implies a fortiori that program (8) is maximized with cIBA (.), our desired contradiction.
We then assume that
∆′(0) = g(yA)−
∫ yA
y−
g′(y)β(y)dy +
∫ y′A
yA
g′(y)γ(y)dy
−
∫ ym
y′A
g′(y)δ(y)dy +
∫ y+
ym
g′(y)α(y)dy
+
∫ ym
y′A
g(y)η(y)dy − ρ
∫ y+
y−
g(y)dF (y)
≤ 0.
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Integrating by parts, we obtain
∆′(0) = g(yA)− [g(y)β(y)]yAy− +
∫ yA
y−
g(y)β′(y)dy
+ [g(y)γ(y)]y
′
A
yA
−
∫ y′A
yA
g(y)γ′(y)dy
− [g(y)δ(y)]ym
y′A
+
∫ ym
y′A
g(y)δ′(y)dy
+ [g(y)α(y)]y+ym −
∫ y+
ym
g(y)α′(y)dy
+
∫ ym
y′A
g(y)η(y)dy − ρ
∫ y+
y−
g(y)dF (y)
≤ 0,
which simplifies to
∆′(0) = g(yA)
−g(yA)β(yA) + g(y−)β(y−) +
∫ yA
y−
[
β′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
+g(y′A)γ(y
′
A)− g(yA)γ(yA) +
∫ y′A
yA
[−γ′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
−g(ym)δ(ym) + g(y′A)δ(y′A) +
∫ ym
y′A
[
δ′(y) + η(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
+g(y+)α(y+)− g(ym)α(ym) +
∫ y+
ym
[−α′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
≤ 0.
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Regrouping terms, we have
∆′(0) = g(yA) (1− β(yA)− γ(yA))
+g(y′A)
(
γ(y′A) + δ(y
′
A)
)
−g(ym) (α(ym) + δ(ym))
+g(y−)β(y−) + g(y+)α(y+)
+
∫ yA
y−
[
β′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
+
∫ y′A
yA
[−γ′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
+
∫ ym
y′A
[
δ′(y) + η(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
+
∫ y+
ym
[−α′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
≤ 0.
We can make sure that ∆′(0) ≤ 0 if the Lagrangian functions and multipliers are
chosen to satisfy the following inequalities:
β(yA) + γ(yA) ≥ 1,
γ(y′A) + δ(y
′
A) ≤ 0, (18)
α(ym) + δ(ym) ≥ 0,
β(y−) ≤ 0,
α(y+) ≤ 0,
β′(y) ≤ ρf(y) on [y−, yA]⇒ β(yA)− β(y−) ≤ ρF (yA),
γ′(y) ≥ −ρf(y) on [yA, y′A]⇒ γ(y′A)− γ(yA) ≥ −ρ
(
F (y′A)− F (yA)
)
,
δ′(y) ≤ ρf(y)− η(y) on [y′A, ym]⇒ δ(ym)− δ(y′A) ≤ ρ
(
1/2− F (y′A)
)− Γ(ym),
α′(y) ≥ −ρf(y) on [ym, y+]⇒ α(y+)− α(ym) ≥ −ρ/2,
where
Γ(ym) =
∫ ym
y′A
η(y)dy.
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We must find non-negative functions α(y), β(y), δ(y), γ(y), η(y) and a non-negative
number ρ satisfying those inequalities. Immediately, we deduce from (18) that γ(y′A) =
δ(y′A) = β(y−) = α(y+) = 0.
We simplify and obtain the following system of 6 equations in 6 unknowns,
β(yA) + γ(yA) = 1, (19)
α(ym) + δ(ym) > 0, (20)
β(yA) = ρF (yA), (21)
γ(yA) = ρ
(
F (y′A)− F (yA)
)
, (22)
δ(ym) = ρ
(
1/2− F (y′A)
)− Γ(ym), (23)
α(ym) = ρ/2, (24)
where all inequalities have been replaced by an equal sign, except for (20) where we use
a strict inequality.28
Using (21) and (22) in (19), we obtain that
ρF (yA) + ρ
(
F (y′A)− F (yA)
)
= 1,
⇒ ρF (y′A) = 1
⇒ ρ = 1/F (y′A) ≥ 2.
Then (21) gives
β(yA) =
F (yA)
F (y′A)
∈]0, 1],
while (22) gives
γ(yA) =
F (y′A)− F (yA)
F (y′A)
∈ [0, 1[,
and (24) gives
α(ym) =
1
2F (y′A)
≥ 1.
From (23), we have
δ(ym) =
1/2− F (y′A)
F (y′A)
− Γ(ym),
28The inequality in (20) has to be strict. Otherwise, using (20) and (24) we would obtain that ρ = 0,
a contradiction with what follows.
34
so that we can choose
Γ(ym) =
1/2− F (y′A)
F (y′A)
≥ 0 and δ(ym) = 0
and from (20) we obtain
α(ym) + δ(ym) =
1
2F (y′A)
≥ 1.
From the sign of derivatives of the functions α(y), β(y), δ(y), γ(y) and η(y) we can
then immediately verify that they are non-negative in their intervals when end points
are defined as above, meaning that we have indeed constructed non-negative Lagrangian
functions, and proved our claim.
C Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that cIIBA (y) does not solve the optimization
program (10), but rather that the function c∗(y) does. Define g(y) = c∗(y) − cIIBA (y),
and consider the convex combination (1−ε)cIIBA (y)+εc∗(y) = cIIBA (yA)+εg(yA), which
is also feasible for program (10).
Define
∆(ε) = cIIBA (yA) + εg(yA)
−
∫ yA
y−
εg′(y)β(y)dy +
∫ yˆA
yA
εg′(y)γ(y)dy
−
∫ y1
yˆA
εg′(y)δ(y)dy +
∫ y˜A
y1
εg′(y)α(y)dy
−
∫ y′′A
y˜A
εg′(y)η(y)dy +
∫ y+
y′′A
εg′(y)θ(y)dy
+
∫ y1
yˆA
(
cIIBA (y) + εg(y)− coptB (y)
)
λ1(y)dy
+
∫ y+
y′′A
(
cIIBA (y) + εg(y)− coptB (y)
)
λ2(y)dy
+ρ
[
y¯ −
∫ y+
y−
(
cIIBA (y) + εg(y)
)
dF (y)
]
,
where α(y), β(y), δ(y), γ(y), η(y), θ(y), λ1(y) and λ2(y) are non-negative functions while
ρ is a non-negative number.
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Observe that ∆ is linear in ε, with ∆(0) corresponding to program (10) with cIIBA (.),
and with ∆(1) corresponding to program (10) with c∗(.), plus a series of non-negative
terms: for instance, in the intervals [y−, yA] and [yˆA, y1], g′ ≤ 0 because cIIB′A (y) = 1.
Suppose that we can find α(y), β(y), δ(y), γ(y), η(y), θ(y), λ1(y), λ2(y) and ρ (all
non-negative) such that ∆′(0) ≤ 0. Since ∆ is a linear function of ε, it will follow that
∆(0) ≥ ∆(1), which implies a fortiori that program (10) is maximized with cIIBA (.), our
desired contradiction.
We then assume that
∆′(0) = g(yA)−
∫ yA
y−
g′(y)β(y)dy +
∫ yˆA
yA
g′(y)γ(y)dy
−
∫ y1
yˆA
g′(y)δ(y)dy +
∫ y˜A
y1
g′(y)α(y)dy
−
∫ y′′A
y˜A
g′(y)η(y)dy +
∫ y+
y′′A
g′(y)θ(y)dy
+
∫ y1
yˆA
g(y)λ1(y)dy +
∫ y+
y′′A
g(y)λ2(y)dy
−ρ
∫ y+
y−
g(y)dF (y)
≤ 0.
Integrating by parts, we obtain
∆′(0) = g(yA)− [g(y)β(y)]yAy− +
∫ yA
y−
g(y)β′(y)dy
+ [g(y)γ(y)]yˆAyA −
∫ yˆA
yA
g(y)γ′(y)dy
− [g(y)δ(y)]y1yˆA +
∫ y1
yˆA
g(y)δ′(y)dy
+ [g(y)α(y)]y˜Ay1 −
∫ y˜A
y1
g(y)α′(y)dy
− [g(y)η(y)]y′′Ay˜A +
∫ y′′A
y˜A
g(y)η′(y)dy
+ [g(y)θ(y)]
y+
y′′A
−
∫ y+
y′′A
g(y)θ′(y)dy
+
∫ y1
yˆA
g(y)λ1(y)dy +
∫ y+
y′′A
g(y)λ2(y)dy − ρ
∫ y+
y−
g(y)dF (y)
≤ 0,
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which simplifies to
∆′(0) = g(yA)
−g(yA)β(yA) + g(y−)β(y−) +
∫ yA
y−
[
β′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
+g(yˆA)γ(yˆA)− g(yA)γ(yA) +
∫ yˆA
yA
[−γ′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
−g(y1)δ(y1) + g(yˆA)δ(yˆA) +
∫ y1
yˆA
[
δ′(y) + λ1(y)− ρf(y)
]
g(y)dy
+g(y˜A)α(y˜A)− g(y1)α(y1) +
∫ y˜A
y1
[−α′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
−g(y′′A)η(y′′A) + g(y˜A)η(y˜A) +
∫ y′′A
y˜A
[
η′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
+g(y+)θ(y+)− g(y′′A)θ(y′′A) +
∫ y+
y′′A
[−θ′(y) + λ2(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
≤ 0.
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Regrouping terms, we have
∆′(0) = g(yA) (1− β(yA)− γ(yA))
+g(yˆA) (γ(yˆA) + δ(yˆA))
−g(y1) (α(y1) + δ(y1))
+g(y˜A)(α(y˜A) + η(y˜A))
−g(y′′A)(η(y′′A) + θ(y′′A))
+g(y−)β(y−) + g(y+)θ(y+)
+
∫ yA
y−
[
β′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
+
∫ yˆA
yA
[−γ′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
+
∫ y1
yˆA
[
δ′(y) + λ1(y)− ρf(y)
]
g(y)dy
+
∫ y˜A
y1
[−α′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
+
∫ y′′A
y˜A
[
η′(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
+
∫ y+
y′′A
[−θ′(y) + λ2(y)− ρf(y)] g(y)dy
≤ 0.
We can make sure that ∆′(0) ≤ 0 if the Lagrangian functions and multipliers are
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chosen to satisfy the following inequalities:
β(yA) + γ(yA) ≥ 1,
γ(yˆA) + δ(yˆA) ≤ 0,
α(y1) + δ(y1) ≥ 0,
α(y˜A) + η(y˜A) ≤ 0,
η(y′′A) + θ(y
′′
A) ≥ 0,
β(y−) ≤ 0,
θ(y+) ≤ 0,
β′(y) ≤ ρf(y) on [y−, yA]⇒ β(yA)− β(y−) ≤ ρF (yA)
γ′(y) ≥ −ρf(y) on [yA, yˆA]⇒ γ(yˆA)− γ(yA) ≥ −ρ (F (yˆA)− F (yA))
δ′(y) ≤ ρf(y)− λ1(y) on [yˆA, y1]⇒ δ(y1)− δ(yˆA) ≤ ρ (F (y1)− F (yˆA))− Γ1(y1)
α′(y) ≥ −ρf(y) on [y1, y˜A]⇒ α(y˜A)− α(y1) ≥ −ρ(F (y˜A)− F (y1))
η′(y) ≤ ρf(y) on [y˜A, y′′A]⇒ η(y′′A)− η(y˜A) ≤ ρ
(
F (y′′A)− F (y˜A)
)
θ′(y) ≥ −ρf(y) + λ2(y) on [y′′A, y+]⇒ θ(y+)− θ(y′′A) ≥ −ρ(1− F (y′′A)) + Γ2(y+),
where
Γ1(y1) =
∫ y1
yˆA
λ1(y)dy,
Γ2(y+) =
∫ y+
y′′A
λ2(y)dy.
We must find non-negative functions α(y), β(y), δ(y), γ(y), η(y), θ(y), λ1(y) and
λ2(y) and a non-negative number ρ satisfying those inequalities. Immediately, we deduce
from above that γ(yˆA) = δ(yˆA) = α(y˜A) = η(y˜A) = 0.
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We can then simplify and obtain the following system of 9 equations in 9 unknowns:
β(yA) + γ(yA) = 1, (25)
α(y1) + δ(y1) > 0, (26)
η(y′′A) + θ(y
′′
A) > 0, (27)
β(yA) = ρF (yA), (28)
γ(yA) = ρ (F (yˆA)− F (yA)) , (29)
δ(y1) = ρ (F (y1)− F (yˆA))− Γ1(y1), (30)
α(y1) = ρ(F (y˜A)− F (y1)), (31)
η(y′′A) = ρ(F (y
′′
A)− F (y˜A)), (32)
θ(y′′A) = ρ(1− F (y′′A))− Γ2(y+), (33)
where all inequalities have been replaced by an equal sign, except for (26) and (27)
where we use the strict inequality.29
Using (28) and (29) in (25), we obtain that
ρF (yA) + ρ (F (yˆA)− F (yA)) = 1,
⇒ ρF (yˆA) = 1
⇒ ρ = 1/F (yˆA) ≥ 2.
Then (28) gives
β(yA) =
F (yA)
F (yˆA)
∈]0, 1],
while (29) gives
γ(yA) =
F (yˆA)− F (yA)
F (yˆA)
∈ [0, 1[.
Once ρ has been identified, we can use equations (31) and (32) to pinpoint the values
of α(y1) and η(y
′′
A),which are both positive since ρ > 0.
From (30), we have
δ(y1) =
F (y1)− F (yˆA)
F (yˆA)
− Γ1(y1),
29The inequality needs to be strict for (26) and (27). Otherwise, we would have (using (31) or (32))
that ρ = 0 and a contradiction with what follows.
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so that we can choose
Γ1(y1) =
F (y1)
F (yˆA)
− 1 ≥ 0 and δ(y1) = 0
and from (26) we obtain
α(y1) + δ(y1) =
F (y˜A)− F (y1)
F (yˆA)
> 0.
Likewise, from (33), we have
θ(y′′A) =
1− F (y′′A)
F (yˆA)
− Γ2(y+),
so that we can choose
Γ2(y+) =
1− F (y′′A)
F (yˆA)
≥ 0 and θ(y′′A) = 0
and from (27) we obtain
η(y′′A) + θ(y
′′
A) =
F (y′′A)− F (y˜A)
F (yˆA)
> 0.
From the sign of derivatives of the functions α(y), β(y), δ(y), γ(y) , η(y), θ(y), λ1(y)
and λ2(y), we can then immediately verify that they are non-negative in their intervals
when end points are defined as above, meaning that we have indeed constructed non-
negative Lagrangian functions, and proved our claim.
D Proof of Proposition 8
We first prove the properties of the function Φ before turning to those of ΦA. The
characteristics of ΦB are obtained in a similar way. Proposition 8 follows from the
definitions and properties of these three curves.
Step 1: The function Φ(yB)
The function Φ is defined in the following way: it gives the (unique) value of yA such
that the median income individual is indifferent between the unconstrained optimal
tax schedule of party A and the unconstrained optimal tax schedule of party B. We
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first prove that, in the space (yB, yA), this curve goes through the point (ym, ym), is
decreasing and crosses the horizontal axis at (α, y−) with ym < α < y+.
The after-tax income of the median voter under A’s optimal tax is
yA +
∫ y+
yA
(y − yA)dF
whereas it is
ym +
∫ y+
yB
(y − yB)dF
under B’s optimal tax, where we have used (6) and (7). The condition yA = Φ(yB) can
thus be written
yA +
∫ y+
yA
(y − yA)dF = ym +
∫ y+
yB
(y − yB)dF . (34)
a) When yA = ym and yB = ym, it is satisfied with equality. Therefore the curve Φ
goes through the point (ym, ym).
b) We then determine how the LHS of (34) varies with yA:
∂
∂yA
(
yA +
∫ y+
yA
(y − yA)dF
)
= F (yA) ≥ 0.
The derivative of the RHS of (34) with respect to yB is:
∂
∂yB
(
ym +
∫ y+
yB
(y − yB)dF
)
= F (yB)− 1 ≤ 0.
These two properties imply that the function Φ(yB) is continuous and decreasing.
c) We now argue that
yA +
∫ y+
yA
(y − yA)dF > ym +
∫ y+
yB
(y − yB)dF
for all yA ≤ ym when yB is close to y+.This comes from the observation that
yA+
∫ y+
yA
(y− yA)dF =
∫ yA
y−
yAdF +
∫ y+
yA
ydF ≥ y > ym = lim
yB→y+
ym+
∫ y+
yB
(y− yB)dF .
This inequality, together with the continuity of Φ, implies that the curve Φ crosses the
horizontal axis at the point (α, y−) where ym < α < y+.
The paragraph after the statement of the proposition in section 8 explains why we
have type IA or IIA equilibria when ym ≥ yA > Φ(yB), and type IB or IIB equilibria
when y− < yA < Φ(yB).
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Step 2: The function ΦA(yB)
We now construct the curve ΦA and show that it is decreasing and goes through the
points (ym, ym) and (y+, β), where y− < β < ym. Along this curve (i.e., when yA =
ΦA(yB)), party B is indifferent between playing the strategy c
IA
B or c
IIA
B when party A
proposes its optimal tax schedule. As the utility level attained by party B is continuous
in yB under both policies c
IA
B and c
IIA
B , the function ΦA is also continuous in yB.
Take any point on Φ except (ym, ym) and consider an increase in yB: yB → yB + δ.
We argue that for δ arbitrarily small, B prefers to play cIAB to c
IIA
B when A proposes its
ideal policy. The argument is that when δ gets small, cIAB gets arbitrarily close to B’s
ideal policy coptB (recall that along Φ the median voter is indifferent between the ideal
policies of the two parties) while cIIAB does not. Then it is easy to see that, for small δ
enough, B strictly prefers cIAB to c
IIA
B .
Next consider the point (ym, ym). We argue that at any point to the right of (ym, ym),
B prefers cIIAB to c
IA
B . This follows from the fact that c
IA
A is the ideal policy of the median
voter, coptm , when yA = ym. Consequently, c
IA
B must also be equal to c
opt
m for B to be
reelected by the median voter. It then immediate follows that cIIAB is preferred by B to
cIAB , as it gives less income to ym individuals and more to yB individuals.
These two facts imply that ΦA is to the right of Φ and crosses the axis yA = ym at
(ym, ym) only. Therefore ΦA is decreasing over some subset of its support.
We now argue that ΦA cannot increase, by showing that at any point to the right
of ΦA, B prefers c
IIA
B to c
IA
B .
Consider a point (yB, yA) on ΦA (corresponding tax schedules are represented on
figure 5) and increase slightly yB : yB → yB + δ. The initial point being on ΦA, we
have cIAB (yB, yB, yA) = c
IIA
B (yB, yB, yA), namely B obtains the same after-tax income
by playing cIAB or c
IIA
B . We then construct c
IA
B (y, yB+δ, yA). It is represented on Figure
5. It is identical to cIAB (y, yB, yA) for values of y ≤ y′B; for y > y′B, it corresponds to
the dashed green curve. Then consider the strategy for yB + δ that corresponds to the
dashed green curve for y larger than y′B and to c
IIA
B (y, yB, yA) for lower values of y.
This tax function satisfies by construction the GBC and yields 50% of the votes to B.
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Moreover, it provides exactly the same net income as cIAB (y, yB + δ, yA) to people with
gross income yB + δ. Therefore there exists a tax schedule in the family c
IIA
B that is at
least as good as cIAB for individuals with income yB + δ. This means that c
IIA
B is weakly
preferred to cIAB and thus that the equilibrium cannot be IA to the right of ΦA (either
the curve ΦA is flat or the equilibrium is IIA).
Finally we prove that ΦA cannot cross the horizontal axis yA = y−, that is ΦA(y+) >
y− for any yB ≤ y+. To do so, it is sufficient to show that B strictly prefers cIAB to cIIAB
when yA → y−. When yA = y−, A’s optimal tax policy consists in giving the same
net income, y, to everyone (the function cIAA is flat). This has a direct implication for
strategy cIIAB : when yA gets arbitrarily close to y−, B has no other choice than proposing
a tax schedule cIIAB arbitrarily close to c
IA
A . It is then easy to see from Figure 3 why
party B prefers the schedule cIAB : this schedule gives less than y¯ to individual with
income y < ym in order to increase after-tax consumption of individuals y
′
B < y ≤ y+.
We then have that cIAB (yB, yB, y−) > c
IIA
B (yB, yB, y−).
Step 3: The function ΦB(yB)
The technique used for constructing ΦB is similar to the one used for ΦA.
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Figure 1: Optimal tax schedules of the two parties
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Figure 2: Party B proposes its unconstrained optimal policy
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Figure 3: Party A proposes its unconstrained optimal policy
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Figure 4: Partition of equilibria
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Figure 5: Construction of ΦA
51
